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CHAPTER NINE

The Politics of Belonging and Settler Cultural Identity: The Emergence of Kano as a Multicultural Society

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Citizenship can be thought of as a key marker of contemporary life. It denotes a boundary making decision system about what is considered legitimate and the norm within a particular community. This suggests that citizenship is the accumulation of such decisions over a long-duration. What feeds these decisions? The most precise answer would have to be the cultural practices that are judged and regarded to be important to the social, political and legal fabric of society. Citizenship, in an ongoing contest with subjectivity and identity, maintains its validity by being the measure upon which "true" belonging and participation are conceived. Citizenship and identity are therefore bound together.

The conceptualization of contemporary citizenship, its definitions and its implications is not an easy task. For one thing, conceptions of citizenship need to "avoid the homogenizing assumptions implicit in unitary and exclusive conceptions of identity" (Kaplan, 1997: 68). Thus, as further

argued by Requejo (1999), the concept of citizenship has been interpreted in different ways throughout history. For instance, since the time of classical Greece it has always been taken to refer to an *individual* member of a political community, and considered to be one of the basic references of individual and collective identity of this community.

In modern democracies, citizenship involves direct or indirect participation in the exercise of sovereignty. But beyond this strict definition, the notion of citizenship has come to incorporate rights of a diverse nature. According to the classical distinction proposed by Marshall, these may be defined as civil, social and political (Marshall, 1950). As it gains momentum in recent times, the notion of citizenship has undergone multiple redefinitions that blur these traditional distinctions, rearticulate the civil and the political, and reshuffle the debate between citizenship and identity. As Don Handelman (1994: 443) argued when considering the issue of nationality in Israel,

> In a democratic state, citizenship rests on the premise that each individual eligible for citizenship is the moral and political equal of every other. Each citizen exists as a unit of meaning paralleling that of every other citizen see Segal 1988). Citizenship is a property of the individual, and the unity of the democratic state arises out of the equal relationship that each citizen acknowledges to every other person similarly defined. Emphasis in such a social order is placed on the claim of basic similarities among its members, and each is accorded both rights and obligations. But, as Dumont 1986) points out, there is no requirement that citizens of the democratic state share in any essential socio-cultural sameness of being. In this regard, the sensibilities of personhood and identity of each citizen in principle may be distinct from those of any other.

Sanchez-Mazas, M. and Klein, O. (2003) ask why study citizenship from a social-psychological perspective? One reason is certainly that social psychologists can enlighten the understanding of this "essentially contested concept" Gallie, quoted by Lister, (1997) with their theoretical and empirical knowledge on social identification processes. Another reason is that in studying citizenship issues, much can be gained for the study of social identity itself. This concept, which refers to "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group or groups together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" Tajfel, (1981: 255) is at the core of one of the dominant contemporary theories on intergroup relations. New dimensions of citizenship brought to the fore by the current political transformations, especially the emergence of a supranational frame of identification in Europe, and in smaller scale in African countries coping with migratory patterns) and of multiple identities in the public sphere, call for a study of social identity in connection with the notion of citizenship.

Emerging after the industrial revolution and still dominant, the traditional national model of citizenship is based on a construction of the State as representing a single ethnic group or "nation" (Breuilly, 1982; Gellner, 1994; Hobsbawm, 1990). The form of identification presumed in this model was "ethnic" in its form i.e., it presupposed the construction of a nation sharing a common culture, history, language, religion, ancestors and/or any combination thereof. This view of identification requires a subjective homogenization of the national citizenry, often realized through an essentialization of the nation. In psychological terms, loyalty and support for the State was thought to derive

from identification with the group it is supposed to represent (Hobsbawm, 1983).

The question of what drives people to support, or to contest, existing authorities and institutions has attracted social psychological interest for decades. Yet, one may argue that recent conceptualizations of such loyalty have been largely based on an "ethnic" view of citizenship. Individuals are thought to support a group to the extent that they self-define as members of this group, which, in turn, demands that they view it as a cohesive entity (see e.g. Castano 1998; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Hogg 1987; Hogg & Hardie 1991).

While Licata et al. (2003) question the view that similarity is the key to identification, which determines loyalty, Depuiset and Butera (2003) address the issue of loyalty through the distinction, offered by Schatz and Staub (1997) between "constructive" and "blind" patriotism. The latter reflects the classic form of loyalty, characteristic of "classic" nationalism and based on an unmitigated support to the in-group whereas the former incorporates a critical dimension which has gained prior importance in the civil society described by Habermas (1992), and characterized by permanent debate and the absence of consensus. While Schatz and Staub viewed these two aspects as fixed personality traits, Depuiset et al. show that constructive patriotism can vary as a function of the perceived legitimacy of the actions of the authorities. In presenting this perspective, they "de-essentialize" patriotism, and show that it should be considered not only in terms of self-definition and emotional attachment to an in-group, but as embedded in specific political relations with authorities.

The social identity tradition (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) has very much relied on a phenomenological definition of identity, focusing on the cognitions, evaluations and emotions associated with group membership (Tajfel, 1981; see also Turner, 1982). In this view, group behavior is often considered as only a consequence of this self-definition rather than as actually constructing it. Yet, identities are not only defined cognitively, they are embedded and constructed in action.

Even when groups draw upon historical and religious references, they actively construct their identities around a plurality of political projects not only aiming at recognition of particularisms but also at political involvement in the broader society. These interpretations are precisely the focus of the arguments by Hopkins, Reicher and Kahani-Hopkins (2003) where they analyze how members of a minority group, the Muslim Community in Britain, use religious narratives to justify specific political projects in the context of British society. They highlight a crucial message: Identities are not self-evident consequences of particular social contexts but they are constructed and contested through debate in the public sphere. They also illustrate the deep interconnection between identity and politics in the context of the emerging broader conceptualizations of citizenship, in which identities are constructed through claims making.

But the link between identity and action is not limited to claims making in the public sphere. Civil society is not only the sphere where individuals can freely express opinions, endorse religious beliefs of their choice, and be granted autonomy and protection against arbitrary treatment. Indeed, in the present-day, an increasing proportion of initiatives and

tasks are assumed by social networks serving specific groups or by the whole collectivity. Sturmer and Kampmeier (2003) focus on a specific form of such a collective behavior, community volunteerism, which can be considered as a response to the transformation of the "Welfare" State and calls for new forms of solidarity. Volunteering is taken as an example of active citizenship in the benefit of society that demands social psychological explanations, in particular in terms of social identifications with the local community.

Further, embedded assumptions in citizenship discourses consists of what is decided, legitimated, ruled and regulated by the dominant voices in society. Central to the technologies of regulation are issues of identity, which complicate any formulation of citizenship. For example, the technologies of regulation that were explicit in the emergence of Kano identity are based on embedded policies with significant focus on patriarchal, religious, and Hausa mindset characteristics. It is not enough to be *in* Kano to be a Kano citizen, one has to *subsume* the soul of Kano itself.

Definitions of citizenship are therefore tied up in examining the intersections of identity, culture, politics, virtue, education, history, law and territory. The dissolution of borders and the transnational flow of individuals from one location to another has created a migratory corridor that enables individuals, families and whole clusters of people to relocate to another, of different, social and cultural environment. The integration of a new arrivals into a the community is not always without its challenges as the new arrivals have to cope with a series of social expectations often different from the ones they are accustomed to.

Identity Markers for Ethnicity

Green (2004) cites the two most commonly cited scholars on ethnic studies, David Horowitz and Anthony Smith to indicate that delineating ethnicity is fraught with difficulties. For instance, she cites Horowitz (1985: 17-18) claiming that ethnic groups are defined through ascriptive differences, i.e., those attributes of a group that are consciously used to distinguish themselves from other groups. These differences include color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof. Further Horowitz emphasizes the inclusive aspect of his definition, where, as with Smith, there is no one overriding way to measure the existence of an ethnic group. Indeed, he singles out color, language and religion as indicators that cannot alone measure ethnic groups, writing for instance that linguistic differences may or may not be regarded as demarcating different ethnic groups. As Horowitz (1985: 50) notes, language differences often occur within ethnic groups along class and rural-urban divides, while many ethnic groups share the same language but view themselves as permanently distinctive; one could mention such famous examples of the Tutsi and Hutu of Rwanda and Burundi or Serbs and Croats in former Yugoslavia although in the past decade Serbo-Croatian has been officially split into Serbian and Croatian).

Similarly, Smith cites a myth of common ancestry as one of several characteristics of ethnic groups. Interestingly, among Smith (1991)'s ethnic characteristics - which include a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population –

there is no mention of language or religion. Indeed, (Smith 1986: 27) singles out scholars who "persist in regarding language as the distinguishing mark of ethnicity, a standpoint that leads to gross simplification and misunderstanding... Language is one of the most malleable and dependent cultural categories." Like Horowitz, Smith's definition does not contain any one element that could be said to be essential — except, perhaps, for a proper name — precisely because ethnicity comes in various shapes and sizes across time and space.

Unlike the quantoid scholar, the interpretivist scholar, on the other hand, throws his/her hands up at this multiplicity and complexity and instead chooses to employ a variety of definitions suitable to each case study Fearon and Laitin (2000: 4). This approach is used by a variety of scholars. For instance, many anthropologists are cautious in defining ethnicity outright, preferring to let their subjects define the term. One such anthropologist, Jack David Eller, claims that, rather than being "a single unified social phenomenon," ethnicity is actually a family of "related but analytically distinct phenomena" (Eller 1999: 7). An interpretivist approach is also apparent in much postmodernist and post-Marxist work. Such authors as Stuart Hall, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein claim that "ethnicity must be viewed as a plastic and malleable social construction, deriving its meanings from the particular situations of those who invoke it...Ethnicity has no essence or center, no underlying features or common denominator" (in Smith 1998: 204).

It is within this context that I want to show how *Kasar* Kano, referring to the territory of Kano, but specifically the city itself, evolved as a result of immigration of various groups

of people over the centuries – and yet which fused together to form a singular ethnic Hausa identity – arguing that ethnicity does has essence, center, underlying features and common denominators.

Hausa and the Question of Ethnic Identity

As Miles (1994) pointed out, traditionally, Hausa scholars have divided into two basic camps on the issue of Hausa identity. On the one hand are those for whom "Hausa" is primarily a linguistic designation and who minimize it as a cultural or ethnic category. They point to the substantial historical and religious diversity among the various Hausa-speaking peoples, seeing only language as a common point of reference. Thus M. G. Smith says that "Hausa is a linguistic term" and that "it is misleading in other contexts" 1959:239 - 40), and Polly Hill asserts that "Hausa is a linguistic not an ethnic term, and refers to those who speak the Hausa language by birth" (1972:3).

On the other hand are those scholars who, despite variations, perceive an underlying common ethnic denominator among those people whose native language happens to be Hausa. These include Guy Nicolas "The term 'Hausa' designates one of the most important ethnic groups of Africa...not all Hausa speakers are Hausa" (1975:399) and Abner Cohen "One of the best-known ethnic groups (in) West Africa is the Hausa" (1969:8).

Other anthropologists avoid this language/ethnicity dichotomy by claiming that Hausa is both — or neither. Thus Jerome Barkow (1973:186) writes: "Hausa (is) a term with two referents: first, Hausa is a language... second, it is a civilization encompassing kingdoms, conquests, walled cities,

an ancient literate tradition..." Frank Salamone (1971:337), wishing to avoid the standard definitional choice, claims that "many problems disappear if one regards 'Hausa' as a cultural term and uses other terms for various ethnic groups who share...in that culture...(The use of) 'Hausa' (as) a linguistic term presents one immediately with the problem of being misunderstood."

Further, Miles (1994) contends that the question of Hausa ethnicity is complicated by the existence in Hausaland itself of two competing standards of what constitutes Hausa identity. Traditionally, according to Hausa folklore and cosmogony, there are seven separate Hausa nations or "families," distinguished by their respective geographical origins. The Hausa Bakwai were considered the original Hausa States by virtue of being ruled by a son and six grandchildren of a ruler of Daura before 1000. These territories – which had no other language but Hausa – were Daura, Katsina, Gobir, Kano, Rano, Zaria and Biram (near Auyo in present Jigawa State). His other seven grandchildren from the son in Hausa Bakwai (from concubines not legally married to the son) became political leaders of territories referred to as Banza Bakwai (bastard seven) and these were Kebbi, Yawuri, Zamfara, Gwari, Jukun Kororofa), Nupe, and Ilorin Yoruba. Thus in Hausa mythology, a person claims to be Hausa if they can trace their descent from the Hausa Bakwai territories.

It should be pointed out, however, that the foundation of the political dynasties of these territories does not equate with their *ethnic* foundation. For instance, when Bagauda came to Kano, he found a well-established religious and commercial culture which had been in existence for hundreds of years. He could not, therefore be the "founder" of Kano (see

Smith 1970 for further elucidations on this). Nor could Bayajidda, Bagauda's grandfather from Daura be considered even the founder of Hausa states or Hausa people.

Kano Territory and Immigrant Influx, 1000-1500 CE

The Kano territory, blessed as it was as an agricultural fertile land, had always attracted immigrants. The legends of the origin of Kano (*Kano Chronicle, The Song of Bagauda*) all attributed the founding of the city-state at the foot of Dala Hill to a group of migrants from other parts of Kano territory, particularly Gaya – although all of the same ethnic group – Hausa. From the founding of the community of artisanal clans at the foot of Dala hill sometimes in 700, these inhabitants of what later became Kano city were referred to as Warjawa or Abagayawa. The legend of origin, Kano Chronicle, records the arrival and settlement of a person who eventually became Dala, and whom might have come from the Dahlak Archipelago, an island group located in the Red Sea near Massawa, Eritrea. This marked the first external migrant to the community, and significantly, he brought with him not only a religious concept – for the original inhabitants of Dala hill do not seem to have any formalized religion – but also a whole raft of new innovations in worshiping the deity. The fetish they eventually ended up worshiping was Tchunburburai, based on a tree, Shamuz. The accoutrements of the worship of the deity seemed to have significant similarities to Middle Eastern pagan beliefs – a walled enclosure for the fetish and specific worship days interestingly enough referred to as Eid days.

This state of religious affairs continued for many centuris, with the Tchunburburai priests holding sway in the

increasingly prosperous community – and it was this prosperity of the small artisanal community that attracted often unwanted visitors to a community that had no standing army to defend itself. Further, economic wealth in any community creates rivalry and soon enough intense rivalry and competition erupted among the occupational clan heads. In order to prevent their community from internally imploding, the clan chiefs were however able to gather enough agreement among themselves to request for assistance from Daura, whose dominion they had anciently recognized. Their request was for someone to keep the peace among them (Dokaji 1959). A prince, Bagauda, was sent to provide Kano with military and political leadership in 1000.

Before Bagauda came from Daura, by way of Gaya according to the folksong (Hiskett 1964,1965a, 1965b) other people from Daura had settled at Gano and Debi in southeastern Kano as immigrant communities. This indeed might have provided a clue as to why Daura was chosen as the source for military support. Although he came as a peacekeeper, he eventually ended up becoming their leader and establishing a dynasty that was to last up to 1807 with the new Fulani dynasty that was the outcome of another group of migrant settlers, the Fulani.

Despite the claims of being descended from a prince of Baghdad, Abu Yazid Bayajidda) there was no historical evidence to show that Bagauda – or indeed Abu Yazid himself – was Muslim. Consequently, a parallel structure was established – a pagan cult worship by immigrants Dala and his descendents) and a new political culture by Bagauda – with the ordinary Hausa caught right in the middle. The

relationship between the two political leaders was certainly not cordial. As Smith (1997: 112) noted,

> When the question of intermarriage with the immigrants Daurawa) arose, the indigenous people Kanawa) decided against it. Thus the stockaded town came to include two endogamous collectivities, one of which, the indigenous people, reserved its ancient ritual to itself. Such chiefship as Gajimasu may have exercised was thus conditional, tenuous, and probably restricted to the immigrants. The autochthonous people preserved their collective cohesion by excluding the immigrants from cult and marriage.

This was during the rule of the third ruler of Kano from Bagauda, Gajimasu 1095-1134) – revealing a diehard suspicion to immigrants – despite the political and military stability they brought – which had lasted for over 100 years.

This mutual suspicion eventually exploded into open warfare leading to military campaigns by the subsequent rulers of Kano against the pagan worshippers, which ended in Tsamiya's reign when the most fiercest of the battles were fought and most of the indigenous population left the city of Kano to continue their pagan worships elsewhere.

The Islamic reforms of Mansa Musa in Mali 1312-1337, most memorable for his Hajj in 1326) created a large pool of Muslim Mandingo (Wangarawa) missionaries who became labeled the Dyula. Merchants to the core, these Muslim missionaries traveled from place to place spreading Islam. They arrived Kano in about 1380 during the reign of Yaji (1349-1385) who readily accepted Islam from them and ordered it to be the State religion. Kano became officially an Islamic State since that year. This marked the beginning of Islamic ascendancy in Kano, and the diminishing of pagan religious practices. The Hausa who refused to accept Islam and maintained their religious identity subsequently became

Maguzawa (those who ran away). Subsequent rulers in Kano strengthened the Islamic stand and this made Kano more attractive to other Muslim immigrants. According to the *Kano Chronicle,* the main source of the history of Kano,

> In Yakubu's (1452-1463), the Fulani came to Hausa land from Mele (Mali) bringing with them books on divinity and etymology. Formerly our doctors had, in addition to the Koran, only the books of the Law and the Traditions. The Fulani passed by and went to Bornu, leaving few men in Hausa land...At this time too the Asbenawa came to Gobir and salt became common in Hausaland. In the following year merchants from Gwanja began coming to Katsina; Beriberi came in large numbers and a colony of Arabs arrived. Some of the Arabs settled in Kano and some in Katsina. There was no war in Hausaland in Yakubu's time. He sent ten horses to the Sarkin Nupe in order to buy ten eunuchs. The Sarkin Nupe gave him twelve eunuchs Palmer 1908: 77).

It is significant that the arrival of the Fulani to Kano coincided with the arrival of Arab merchants from north Africa within the same time period. Both the two groups of migrants brought with them new ideas of scholarship, statecraft and mercantile capitalism. Their foreign – and clearly superior status in terms of wealth, knowledge and skills – made them an elite class within a community that was thirsty for knowledge and commerce. Using their elite status, the two groups remained more or less exclusive. As Smith (1997: 32-33) noted,

> Like Fulani, the local Arabs willingly accepted native women as wives or concubines while reserving their daughters for their kinsmen and fellow Arabs; but while Fulani exclusiveness helped to reinforce their specializations as pastoralists or as a closed intelligentsia in which Islamic learning and ideals were preserved and transmitted within lineages linked by kinship and marriage, among the Arabs ethnic closure enabled them to preserve their

> delicate and extensive commercial arrangements as a corporate ethnic monopoly. However they may have disapproved the local practice of Islam, as a protected group of alien merchants, these Arabs apparently withheld their comment and confined their public interests to the market and the caravan trade. Some adopted the local practice of slave farming in internally autonomous settlements under resident slave headmen. Occasionally, they served the chief or his treasurer, the Ma'aji, as scribes, creditors, commission agents or simply as translators and computers. As we have seen, they were also probably responsible for compiling and maintaining the local chronicle, whether with the ruler's support we do not know. Otherwise, they kept away from the court, and administered their community affairs after their own customs, as their descendants still do.

An irony in settler psychology and politics of belonging seemed to play itself here. While the indigenous Hausa refused to intermarry with immigrants from Daura; the new Fulani and Arab immigrants were not too keen to intermarry with any of the two groups.

By the time of Muhammad Rumfa (1463-1499) Islamic scholarship was massively boosted by more immigrant influx of clerics and scholars. Most notable were another group of Wangarawa clerics from Mali (Al-Hajj 1968, Lovejoy 1978), and the noted Islamic scholar Al-Maghili from north Africa. Kano therefore became a second home for many north African Arabs. As the German explorer Paul Staudinger reported in 1885 during the reign of Muhammad Bello (1882-1893):

> Kano is the capital of the richest and most flourishing province of present-day Hausaland. A tremendous quantity of treasures, that is according to the standards of the natives, lies stored within its walls...The reason for the prosperity of this metropolis is to be found...in the fact that Kano is the trade emporium for the whole of Hausaland and moreover the southern-most market of the

> Arabs. Perhaps sixty to eighty North Africans are permanent residents, but during the dry season several hundred of them live here. It is also then that huge caravans from different Tuareg tribes arrive with one of the most indispensable items of trade amongst all people — salt...So here is a confluence — all the articles of trade from the English and the French, from the Niger and the Benue, together with all the European and local articles which the Arabs bring...A good many of the skilled Semitic traders own permanent houses and live here married to natives from (Moody 1967: 35-53).

The increasing influx of the Fulani clerics and herdsmen into the Kano basin, attracted by Kano being a center of scholarship as well as a fertile land ensured that a significantly large number of Fulani settled in the territory. Thus gradually the Fulani and the Arabs merely became blended in the multi-ethnic mix of medieval Kano. And Kano did have that unique property: the ability to swallow up individuals and submerge their individual identities while providing them with a new one. The scholastic tradition the Fulani brought with them complement the efforts of the Wangarawa clerics and their descendents into further enriching the scholastic status of medieval Kano.

More Immigrant Influxes

The Arabs were by no means the only cultural and commercial influences on the emergence of Kano as a city-state. They just happened to be the most outstanding by virtue of bringing in foreign goods and practices. By 1770s the kola-nut trade has acquired a great significance as a commercial focus in the Bilad al-Sudan. In the Kano axis of the trade route, the trade was dominated essentially by three networks of Agalawa, Tokarawa and Kambarin Beriberi. Because they

operated on the same route and traded in the same commodity, they developed similar facial marks and were mainly endogamous (Lovejoy 1980).

The Agalawa and Tokarawa had Tuareg roots, while the Kambarin Beriberi had Bornu roots, although they seemed to have followed Sakkwato migratory corridor before settling in Kano territory and city. The Agalawa moved gradually southward from Sahel and Aïr Massif, eventually settling in clusters in Kano territory, with the largest being in the city. The Tokarawa also Bugaje or Buzaye) followed the same migratory pattern. Outside the city the Agalawa and Tokarawa were drawn to settlements like Kura, Garko, Bebeji, Bichi, Kumurya, Utai and Madobi.

In the city, the Agalawa and Tokarawa settled in wards like Sabon Sara, Darma, Bakin Ruwa, Koki, Dala, Salga, and Madabo. The Kambarin Beriberi were found in wards such as Dala, Madigawa, Mararraba and Sabon Sara.

The three trading communities remained distinct entities, although the Agalawa and Tokarawa often inter-marry; while inter-marriage between the two and the Kambarin Beriberi seemed rather rare (Lovejoy 1980). However, they were prudent enough to co-operate in the operation of the kola-nut trade to Gwanja in the Volta basin (present-day Ghana) which they dominated in the 19th century. Of the three groups, the Agalawa had the most capital, acumen and efficacious corporate structure. Thus when the British came in 1903, they readily adapted their long distance trading practices to blend in with the modern trade routes offered. Using the railroad and river transport systems, they merely accelerated the volume of their trade and

diversified their stock of commodities to include hides and skins and groundnuts amongst others.

Ethnic Compositions within the Inner city

The wards have been in the past and continue to be today the basic social units of Kano society. This is more so since the old wards boundaries and the present boundaries which have evolved from the old neighborhoods corresponded to the original pattern of settlement of the area. In other words, groups of migrants settled down in an area together and developed an integrated form of community structure. Many aspects of this original structure can be seen even today in the patterns of interaction of the peoples of the ward.

Thus before the end of 19th century, Kano has become a well-blended melting pot. In the nineteenth century, Kano City was not formally subdivided into wards, although there were sections of the city that consisted of particular ethnic, clan, or occupational groups.

The present boundaries of the wards were drawn in the 1930's by the British Colonial Administration, evidently after some consultation with the residents of the area. Before then, the city had been divided into 10 large wards, of which the present wards formed sub-sections. The original wards were: Cigari, Sarkin Shanu or Makama, Shetima, Jingau, Sheshe, Darma, Zango, Chediya, Madabo and Gwauron Duma.

Within these broad sections were subsections with distinctive characteristics which, to a large extent, became the wards of the twentieth century. Thus the Madabo area included Hausa clans and groups such as the Zaitawa, Dukurawa, and Sankawa which had migrated to Kano before the jihad from Wangara. Chediya included the important

Hausa area of Bakin Ruwa, a triangle stretching west from the market toward Gwauron Dutse and containing descendants of some of the original peoples of Kano. Chediya also contained most of the Arab quarter, and especially those Arabs who had left Katsina for Kano after the jihad. Sheshe was identified with a pre-Jihad migrant group from Birnin Shem, reputedly of Arab origin. Darma included several of the Fulani clans such as Kurawa and Yolawa, as well as the Sharifai area containing the descendants of the North African al-Maghili. This area also contained migrant groups of Nupe (Tudun Nufawa) and Tuareg (Agadasawa). The areas of Makama and Shetima, were principally the Fulani quarters (Paden, 1973: 19)

Thus while the Tripolitanian Arabs and Fulani settlers constituted a sizable influential group in transforming the cultural landscape of the emergent city-state, the centuries reputation of Kano as a center of trade, commerce and agriculture also attracted other groups, who all helped in th transformation of the society.

These groups were not in sufficient quantity to radically alter Kano's linguistic or anthropological characteristics; but they nevertheless played an important role in understanding the cosmopolitan nature of the emergent city-state before the turn of the century. It was trade that brought these people, and as such their contribution to the personality of Kano is quite immense (Perchonok 1972). Virtually all these groups, like the Fulani and Arabs before them, settled in the city, blended with the local populace and became integrated as Kanawa. Despite this plurality, however, it has been noted that,

> despite the fact that the peoples of the area have very diverse origins, the outstanding fact about them today is that they now form a close knit, homogeneous community with a great deal of stability over the

> past 100 years. Their present ethnic homogeneity is the first indicator of this. Today nearly everyone considers himself to be Hausa. The single exception in this case is Dambazau, which is unusual in that it is populated almost entirely by Sarkin Bai and his followers and relatives, who maintain their Fulani identity). Except for this ward, there is none in which the people claiming to be Hausa constitute less than 87%. In many wards it is as high as 90% of the population. The Fulani population is concentrated in Dambazau, which we have already noted, and in Masukwani and Jujin 'Yan-labu, with about 10% and 7% respectively. It is interesting to note that those wards historically were associated with Dambazau's founder Dabo and his followers. Here the evidence seems to support the historical tradition. The scattering of Beriberi in various wards also gives some support to the traditions of origin of some of the people, although generally speaking it seems that all Bornu identity has been lost by the great majority of descendants of the original immigrants. Nupe are concentrated, understandably, in Tudun Nufawa, with a few also in neighboring Makwarari, and also in Kwarin Mabuga. The percentage of other tribes represented is generally very small, and comes mainly from Niger, peoples like Asbinawa, Arabs and other commercial people, with a handful of Yoruba and others from Southern Nigeria (Perchonok 1972: 75).

The Yoruba provided the largest single group of settlers in the city. Indeed the Yoruba, just like the Nupe, had been long-term residents in Kano city, bringing kola nut, salt, potassium, fruits to Kano, and exchanging them for livestock, hides, skins, onions, spices, and pepper. These commercial links with the Kasuwar Kurmi in the city led to their settlement in Unguwar Ayagi. But like some of the Tripolitanian Arabs, when the British who came in 1903 introduced the railroad from Lagos to Kano in 1910, some of the Yoruba — wanting to take advantage of the cheaper railroad transport system, — moved out of Unguwar Ayagi to Sabon Gari. Bako (1990)

recorded the first person to move out as Alhaji Muhammadu Salihu Olowo in 1916. Thus of the 2,000 residents in Sabon Gari in 1921, about 1,478 were Yoruba (Bako 1990: 105). By then most were into the booming groundnut trade and haulage to the coastal areas. Edo immigrations started coming to settle in 1912 (Du-Sai 1986). The Igbo took longer to arrive because the railway links between the East and North was only completed in 1932 after the Makurdi Bridge over river Benue was built.

Trade, however, was not the only focus of the various ethnic clusters in the city. In the Greenhill survey of 1974, it was reported that

> In nearly all the wards we find some types of clubs and associations. The most common of these is the self-help club. This is generally made up of young men, often traders, for the purpose of helping each other in time of need. They take up collections in times of financial crisis, such as marriage, naming ceremonies, etc. In addition, many of these clubs also conduct some adult education ar technical classes, some of them have a small dispensary for the use of people in the ward, and most of them engage in some sorts for civic activities. These commonly include periodic sweeping of the ward, repairing of fallen down houses, etc. As a large proportion of the membership of these clubs are traders, often they carry out activities specifically related to the problems of businessmen. For example, the members would collect money to aid a trader whose goods had been stolen or destroyed by fire or other natural disaster. Other types of clubs are strictly recreational, being mainly for football, table tennis, etc. There are also several types of ethnic organizations in the wards. In Dambazau, there used to exist until the Government decree banning tribal unions) the Dambazawa Youth Club, made up mainly of young educated men of the Dambazawa clan, resident in Dambazau. Their aim was to promote education among the members of the clan, and to encourage recalcitrant parents to send their children to school. There is also a Nupe Association *Jama'iyar*

Nufawa), organized under the leadership of *Wakilin Nufawa* of Kano (Perchonok 1972: 77-78).

Thus nipped in the bud were attempts to form clan, linguistic or ethnic unions early enough that would act as the thin edge of the wedge and make people see each other through ethnic prisms. No doubt ethnic integration was achieved as a result of deliberate policies undertaken by some of the *Amirs*, particularly Abdullahi Bayero. According to one perspective,

> Abdullahi Bayero launched a policy of ethnic integration between the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Nupe and Tripolitanians in Kano. Two methods were used. The first was through respected community leaders, especially the Mallams. The second was through the Sufi orders of Tijjaniya and Qadiriyyah which — except for an isolated hiccup here and there between adherents — enabled effective community integration by their transethnic character (Yahaya 1986).

A summary of some of the inner-city wards and their primary settlers or predominant ethnic grouping is given in Table 1, which brings out the paradox of Kano city: multicultural, multiethnic, multinational, yet homogenous. The preponderance of trading ethnic stocks Agalawa, Asbenawa, Adarawa, Tripolitanians clearly indicated the role commerce played in the settlement and ethnic composition of Kano.

The Politics of Belonging and "Son of the Soil" Syndrome

As we have seen, right from the beginning of migrant movement to the Kano basin, although migrants and settlers were willing to co-exist on commercial and religious matters, each kept a separate identity at the beginning. The identities, however, merged and distinct Kano identify emerged. There are many reasons for this.

First the merger between Hausa and Fulani became easy because all Fulani share with Muslim Hausa an emphasis on agnatic descent and relationships in the allocation of jural status, inheritance, succession and liabilities. Moreover, as with Muslim Hausa, agnation entails no exogamy marriage outside of a specific group especially as required by custom or law) among pastoral or settled Fulani, whereas among the Maguzawa the original Hausa) and southern pagans agnatic descent groups are exogamous. This feature of their social organization accordingly serves to segregate the pagans from surrounding Muslims, both Fulani and Hausa. Lacking exogamous localized lineages ordered by prescriptive relations of descent, patrilineal kin groups among the Muslims, being subject to various situational pressures and contingencies, are labile in their boundaries, composition and social implications (Smith 1997: 28).

Secondly through time, Fulbe Fulani) linguistic expressions became closely identified with Hausa linguistic codes. It is difficult to say whether they evolved together or one was influenced by the other. For instance, like the Hausa, the Fulbe share certain accents in their language – particularly the accented hooked characters , e.g. b' e.g. b'araka, Fulb'e). No other immigrant groups has similar affinity to Hausa language.

Thirdly, Besides designations by provenience, many Fulani communities settled in Kano are also known by Hausa names which either allude to some specific event in the history of the group or misstate its correct Fulani lineage designation, thereby assimilating its Hausa identification to the category of groups distinguished by reference to place.

Nor were the Fulani the only out-group assimilated by the Hausa. The north African Arabs were similarly assimilated totally into the cultural and linguistic universe of the Kano Hausa, such that the original Arab settler community in the city has lost most of its Arabic familial linguistic roots. The initial isolation enforced on themselves by their racial exclusiveness gradually became eroded over the centuries when contacts between the migrant settlers and the "motherland" became rare. They eventually became "sons of the soil" a typical Nigerian expression to indicate a sense of belonging to a territory.

Religion contributed principally to the development of the Kano Hausa mindset. Whether pagan or Islamic, religious doctrines did not contradict the base spiritual beliefs of the indigenous Kano population. As Talbot (1925: 181) pointed out,

> This great city Kano) was then almost at the height of its power and inhabited by a race not very different from the present Hausa, a virile people of some culture and organisation and great traders. As a rule the various invasions and influxes of tribes, many belonging to the same type as themselves, did not change the mass of the population but only the governing classes.

When Dahlak came with ideas of fetish worship, he was accepted, principally because there was no inherent contradiction between what he brought and what the clans and artisanal occupational groups had – which was literally, nothing since they had no organized form of worship.

By 1380 a distinct social and psychological personality had evolved as Kano Hausa. Encoded within their religious practices were a series of behavioral traits that ultimately believed in a creator – even if worshiping Him through a

fetish. The running battles between the religious authorities and the ruling class were more of power struggles over dominion and control, rather than battles to establish religious identity.

When Islam came it found a ready niche – both among the rulers in Kano who had had it with pagan worshippers, and the indigenous populace who possibly tired of the running battle between the two warring groups, were ready to accept an alternative faith. Islam succeeded principally because it posed no principal threat to the fundamental identity of the Kano Hausa. Indeed their mindset values as identified by Kirk-Greene (1974) were not only within Islamic expectations of behavior, but also part of their own indigenous training. These traits al'adu), among others, include *Gaskiya* (truth), *Amana* (strictly friendliness, but used to refer to trust), *Karamci* (open-handed generosity), *Hakuri* (patience), *Hankali* (good sense), *Kunya* (bashfulness), *Ladabi* (courtesy), *Mutumci* (self-esteem), *Hikima* (wisdom), *Adalci* (scrupulous behavior).

It is clear therefore religion was a strong factor in binding migrants and indigenous populations. Equally important is the interface between behaviors the new religion expects and the base behavior of the recipient peoples.

And yet even within the religious matrix, race played a strong factor in the emergence of Kano identity, and this particularly refers to the Arab immigration. Three distinct Arabs settled in Kano. The first were the Tripolitanian Arabs, mainly from Libya who arrived in the 1450s. The second were Yemenite Arabs specifically imported as migrant middle men for an Italian company to trade in skins and hides in Kano. The first Yemenite arrival was Hassan Ali from Aden who settled first at Abuja Road House No J6 in former France

Road, Sabon Gari in 1919, followed by Abdulmalik who later became a P.Z. agent. Al Halaf, another Yemenite came from Aden through Lagos and rail to Kano in 1928, and later encouraged others to follow him (Bako 1990, Adamu 1999). The Yemenite arrival in Kano was gradual, and a distinct racial divide was maintained by the new arrivals and their African hosts. Eventually, however, intermarriage became possible because both the Kano Hausa and the Yemenite subscribed to Sunni Islam. The Yemenite, from the demographic study of their familiar patterns, would, however, seem to prefer marrying Fulani women, while not giving their own daughters to Hausa men, and not marrying Hausa women. They preserve their own daughters for other Yemenites. Eventually this practice was not maintained, and now there are many Yemenite families with Hausa, Yoruba, Idoma and other familial ties – although in-group marriage remained predominant practice.

The third Arab migrants to Kano were the Lebanese. The first Lebanese whose migration was recorded by the colonial officers were two brothers who came to Kano from Lagos in 1903, although they did not settle in the territory until 1907 (Albasu 1989). However, the first migrant to settle permanently in Kano city was recorded as Seman Naoum in 1912. Like all the other Lebanese that were to follow, he was basically a trader in European goods.

The cultural aloofness of the Lebanese in early Kano were noted in the fact that when the British decided to implement the policy of racial separation and create their own reservation areas, the few Lebanese settlers applied for permission to leave the city and settle in the European areas. The British refused to allow the Lebanese to be their

neighbors. Instead, in "1913 an area consisting of twelve plots was marked out west of the railway for "colored traders", meaning the Lebanese." (Albasu 1989: 206).

This area eventually became the Syrian Quarters the entire stretch of present-day Ibrahim Taiwo Road in Kano, starting from Radio Kano and ending at El-Duniya/Kwanar Singa junction) in 1915 and a home to any non-European who wish to pitch his business in the area; although it was dominated by the Lebanese. Seman Naoum the first Lebanese to settle in Kano city, almost immediately moved to the new settlement — ending perhaps the shortest duration of migrant stay in the territory. Eventually more Lebanese arrived in Kano, but they were never fully integrated into the Kano ethnic identity in the same way the other Arabs were. There were three reasons for this.

First, most of the early Lebanese to Kano were Christians and had little empathy with the Muslim Hausa; plus they refused to stay in the city where they stand out, unlike other Christian African migrants (e.g. the Yoruba) who blended. Secondly, the subsequent Lebanese arrivals were Shiite Muslims – creating a wider gap between the predominantly Hausa Sunni Muslims and their own brand of Islam. Third, they simply did not consider the African population as part of their anthropological universe. The few that did marry Hausa women often ended up divorcing them when they get wealthy enough to get a wife imported for them from Lebanon (Albasu 1989). The Lebanese adopted this same strategy in other parts of West Africa where they settled. Fouad Khuri (1968: 90) recounts such practices – and their consequences – as follows:

> The divorce of African wives by their Lebanese husbands, resulting from the latter's acquisition of wealth and the subsequent

> enlargement of their community, has created a mulatto group which recognizes itself to be neither African nor Lebanese but a separate, enclosed community. This is true of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal and in other West African countries where children belong to the father's kin and where the conflict in cultural practices between the Lebanese and the Africans has alienated the mulattoes from both groups.

The conflict in cultural practices between the Kano Lebanese and the Kano Hausa was, as I said earlier, due to the Shiite/Sunni divide which is simply irreconcilable – even if both the sides are ready to accommodate each other's views.

Thus while the north African and Yemenite Arabs – strongly Sunni – gradually became assimilated into the Kano mindset due to cultural similarities see (Adamu 1968, 1998) and eventually even lost their language; the Lebanese Arabs remained aloof, isolated and consistently an out-group in Kano – by choice. Their position is to illustrate the first marketer in ethnic identity in the Kano region.

So what could have explained the Fulani jihad initiated by Shehu Usman Danfodiyo in 1804 and which led to the collapse of the Hausa dynasty in 1807 and its supplanting with a Fulani dynasty in Kano? From the available records, including the diary of the Jihad kept by the jihadist themselves Ado-Kurawa (1989), it could not have been religious. This was because Alwali, the last Hausa emir of Kano was a devout Muslim – indeed far more devout than the jihad leaders in Kano at least in terms of demonstrable commitment to Islam (Khalil 1978, Smith 1997, Adamu 1999).

Consequently, these commentators see ethnic coloration in the cause of the Jihad in Kano, laying beneath an economic tension between the Fulani and the Hausa. If this is

so, then it reflected the first large-scale ethnic conflict in Kano since the founding of the city almost two centuries earlier.

It is instructive that nowhere did the Shehu actually commanded the jihad leaders in Kano to declare any war on anyone. According to Adamu (1999: 62)

> The Shehu, having successfully exiled to Gudu on 21st February 1804, sent a series of circulars to first, Sarakunan Hausa imploring them to re-dedicate themselves to Islam, and shun un-Islamic practices. A second series of circulars were sent to all Muslims residing in Hausaland to perform the *hijrah* so that they can run away from persecution. Even though there were well-established, notable and highly scholastic Hausa clerics e.g. from the Madabo and Zaitawa faculties), it was not clear how the Shehu's second circular seemed to be perceived by the Fulani clansmen in Kano as being aimed specifically at them.

What followed subsequently was a full-scale war that led to the ouster of the Hausa king, Alwali, and his replacement with a Fulani ruler, Sulaiman in 1807.

Sabon Gari Factor in Kano Ethnicity and the Politics of Belonging

The arrival of railroad to Kano in 1911, and later the opening of the Kano International Airport in 1935, also brought with them many ethnic nationalities from what eventually became southern Nigeria and other countries in the former British West African colonies, such as Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. As these nationalities came along with their religion mainly, but not exclusively Christian, and culture different from that of the native population of the Emirate, a strangers' 'guests' quarters' called Sabon Gari (new town) was created for them in 1912.

The initial formal location of Sabon Gari was at the present Our Lady of Fatima Church, along Ilaro Road in 1914. But with more demands for plots, its epicenter shifted to what is now Abuja Road (former France Road). The Lebanese, by now demanding for separate residential area, preferably at Nassarawa, were offered plots at Sabon Gari which they rejected on the grounds that it was too far from the railroad yard, and thus limits their participation in the economy, through their lawyer and instituted what was probably the first law suit in Kano. They apparently won or the British could not be bothered to fight it out, and it was agreed in 1915 that they should be given their own resident areas.

Settlement of the new immigrants in Sabon Gari was further necessitated by the refusal of the then Sarkin Kano Abbas to allow any non-Muslims to reside within the perimeters of the Kano city walls. It seems that that ancient Kano penchant for cultural tolerance has reached its upper limit. But then in the hundreds of years of immigrant settlement, there do not seem to be records of settlers with a totally different religious or cultural orientation to the host community, except with the coming of the British and the lone Lebanese Christian who settled in Kano city in 1912.

Further, by colonial mandate the residents in the Sabon Gari in the colonial northern Nigeria were not under the jurisdiction of the emir, but the British. He had only power over his own subjects. This merely accentuated the religious, ethnic and cultural boundaries cleavages between the indigenous population and the new immigrants (King 2003).

From this historical account of Kano, we could see that ethnicity is a social construction that indicates identification with a group which is often descended from common

ancestors. Members of the group share common cultural traits such as language, religion, and dress) and are an identifiable minority within and are an identifiable minority within the larger nation-state.

Ethnicity is generally regarded as the most basic and politically salient identity in Nigeria. This claim is supported by the fact that both in competitive and non-competitive settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity. Indeed, according to the authoritative 2000 survey on "Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria", ethnicity "is demonstrably the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria" (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 27). Thus, the survey found that almost one-half (48.2%) of Nigerians chose to label themselves with an ethnic including linguistic and local-regional) identity, compared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for class identities, and 21.0 percent who chose a religious identity (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 24-25). In essence, close to two-thirds of the population see themselves as members of primordial ethnic, regional, and religious groups. In other words, "Nigerians tend to cluster more readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of the workplace" (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 25).

What is more, "religious and ethnic identities are more fully formed, more holistic and more strongly felt than class identities" as evidenced in the fact that "whereas those who identify with religious and ethnic communities are almost universally proud of their group identities...those who see themselves as members of a social class are somewhat more equivocal about their pride" (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 26). All of this is not surprising, considering that ethnic formations are

perhaps the most historically enduring behavioral units in the country, and were further reinforced by the colonial and post-colonial regimes. As Osaghe and Subero (2005: 9) argued,

> In the final analysis, it is clear that ethnic diversity cannot be defined only in terms of categories employed by linguists and ethnographers. There is also the whole dimension of self-definition by members of the group and outsiders, which is a much more important determinant of so-called ethnic-based behaviour. As much as possible therefore, the objective diacritic, which many scholars emphasize, should be consistent with the 'constructed reality', self-ascribed identities, or 'imagined communities' of members of the group and outsiders to be valid. This is one useful way of assessing the validity of the various estimations.

Conclusion

Thus for centuries Kano was literally an ethnic melting pot, absorbing and accommodating diverse tributaries of ethnic groups that converged on the city-state and lent its distinct character. I argue that such fusion of various ethnicities into a singular Kanawa identity occurred principally because the new immigrants share base cultural mindset with those they found. It was only after the arrival of British colonial administration in 1903 that Kanawa began to be aware of their ethnicities. Consequently, the "son of the soil" syndrome was a colonial construct. Even the Fulani jihad did not reveal any ethnic cleavage – after the war, it was business as usual in all respects, as the jihadist rulers soon became re-entrenched in Hausa mindset, including virtual abandonment of their language. This created an ethnic irony in Kano in that many Kanawa may claim descent from Fulani, but could not speak the language at all.

Following colonial differentiations into religious and ethnic boundaries of the Kano terri the subsequent

political structures in the larger country of Nigeria merely emphasised the ethnic differences of the constituent units, such that the ethnic absorption into the Kanawa mindset characteristic of earlier centuries simply became impossible due to elite control of the political process. As Larry Diamond (1983: 470) argued,

> At one level of analysis, political conflict in Nigeria during the 1950s may be seen as largely the product of the convergence of ethnic, regional, and political cleavage. All of the major conflicts of the decade tapped at least one of these cleavages directly, and inevitably involved the other two in some form. But, as was the case with the regional and federal elections of the decade, other conflicts that appeared sectional were significantly rooted in class action. For the most part these were elite conflicts, even when they mobilized a mass base. They sprang from the struggle within the elite to control the narrow resource base of an underdeveloped economy and state, a struggle which, in becoming organized along ethnic and regional lines, ultimately infected the whole of political and social life in Nigeria.

Thus in cases of the mass base of ethnic conflicts, they were almost always, at least for the Kano region, ignited either by the political elite or by political processes outside the territory – for instance backlashes against similar action against the Hausa in other parts of the country. This can be illustrated by the first violent modern ethnic clash in Kano in 1953.

In 1953 political confrontation erupted in Federal House of Representatives with the introduction of a notion for independence from Britain in 1956. This motion was predominantly supported by southern Nigerian politicians. The northern politicians, however, were skeptical of this due to the fact that their bureaucracy lacked enough indigenous manpower to sustain the civil service after independence. This was more because the bureaucracy, commerce and transportation systems – elements of modern economy – were

controlled by southern Nigerians. Consequently northern Nigerian politicians blocked the motion – and they were insulted by street crowds in Lagos. To convince northerners to support the motion a delegation of southern Nigerian politicians traveled to Kano – sparking off four days of riots in Sabon Gari that left many people dead and injured – many of them Igbos Coleman (1958: 398-99). As Larry Diamond (1983:. 473) further analyzed,

> Southern elites sincerely saw the North as feudal and backward, a brake upon nationalist progress. And northern elites, both the reigning traditional rulers and the new generation of Western-educated nobility and allied commoners, sincerely perceived the prospect of southern domination as a threat to cherished cultural values and traditions and to the long-term socioeconomic interests of their people. But their attachment to Islamic values could not be separated from their commitment to the particular structure of power and privilege which Islam legitimated. Nor could their concern for their people's social and economic progress be divorced from their anxiety over the threat of southern penetration to their own careers. In short, the fuse for mass violence in Kano was elite conflict over not simply cultural and regional, but also class, interests.

It is clear therefore that the politics of belonging in any society is tied down to the degree with which the settler perceives an inter-relatedness between his cultural identity and the identity of his new community. The dilemma settlers face all the world is, do they retain their own identity, or do they give it up and contribute to the new pool of identity with their host communities? The effective resolution of this dilemma could very well define the degree of integration of a multicultural society.

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Appendix

Table 1

Kano Inner City Wards and Ethnic Identity of Main Settlers[1]

S/N	Ward	Main Settlers
1.	Adakawa	Adarawa (Nigeriène)
2.	Agadasawa	Agadès Tuareg (Nigeriène)
3.	Aikawa	Kano Hausa[2]
4.	Akwa	Kano Hausa
5.	Alfindiki	Tripolitanians
6.	Alkantara	Tripolitanians
7.	Arzai	Tripolitanians
8.	Bakin Ruwa	Kano Hausa (*Black Pool*)
9.	Bakin Zuwo	Tripolitanians/Kanuri
10.	Cedi	Kano Hausa
11.	Cediyar Fero	Kano Hausa[2]
12.	Cediyar Kuda	Kano Hausa
13.	Cediyar 'Yan-gurasa/	Tripolitanians
	Cediyar Abba Kakumi	
14.	Chiromawa	Courtier (*Ciroma*)
15.	Ciranci	Courtiers[3]
16.	Diso	Fulani
17.	Dorayi	Kano Hausa
18.	Daganda	Courtiers
19.	Dala	Dahlak/Ethiopia/Gaya
20.	Danbazau	Fulani
21.	Dandago	Kano Hausa
22.	Dandalin Turawa	Tripolitanians
23.	Daneji	Fulani
24.	Darma	Katsinawa
25.	Daurawa	Daura
26.	Dausayi	Kano Hausa
27.	Dogarai	Kano Hausa

S/N	Ward	Main Settlers
28.	Dogon Nama	Agalawa (Nigeriène Tuareg)
29.	Dukawa	Kano Hausa
30.	Dukurawa	Tripolitanians
31.	Durumin Arbabi	Agadès Tuareg (Nigeriène)
32.	Durumin Daje	Courtiers
33.	Durumin Iya	Kano Hausa (Kutumbawa)[4]
34.	Durumin Kaigama	Bornuans
35.	Durumin Zungura	Kano Hausa
36.	Gabari	Bornuans
37.	Galadanci	Courtier (*Galadima*)
38.	Garangamawa	Chadians
39.	Garke	Wangarawa
40.	Gidan Sarki	Courtiers (The *Amir's* Palace)
41.	Gwangwazo	Gazarzawans (Maguzawa)
42.	Gyaranya	Kano Hausa (*cricket* insect)
43.	Hausawa	Kano Hausa
44.	Indabawa	Kano Hausa
45.	Jingau	Tripolitanians
46.	Jujin 'Yanlabu	Wangarawa
47.	Juma	Wangarawa
48.	Kabara	Malians (Timbucktans)
49.	Kabawa	Kebbi
50.	Kabuwaya	Kano Hausa
51.	Kansakali	Kano Hausa
52.	Kantudu Madabo	Wangarawa
53.	Karofin Gangamau	Kano Hausa
54.	Karofin Kangiwa	Kano Hausa
55.	Kududdufawa	Kano Hausa
56.	Kurawa	Fulani
57.	Kurmawa	Kano Hausa
58.	Kwarin Mabuga	Kano Hausa
59.	Kofar Wambai	Kano Hausa
60.	Kofar Dawanau	Kano Hausa
61.	Kofar Dukawuya	Kano Hausa

S/N	Ward	Main Settlers
62.	Kofar Gadon Kaya	Kano Hausa
63.	Kofar Kabuga	Kano Hausa
64.	Kofar Lunkwi/Kofar Ruwa	Kano Hausa
65.	Kofar Mata	Kano Hausa
66.	Kofar Mazugal	Kano Hausa
67.	Kofar Nasarawa	Kano Hausa
68.	Kofar Waika	Kano Hausa
69.	Koki	Bornuans
70.	Kwalwa	Kano Hausa
71.	Limanci	Courtiers
72.	Lokon Makera	Fulani
73.	Lollokin Lemo	Kano Hausa
74.	Madabo	Wangarawa
75.	Madigawa	Agalawa (Nigeriène Tuareg)
76.	Madungurun	Kano Hausa
77.	Magashi	Kano Hausa
78.	Magoga	Nupe
79.	Mai-Aduwa	Tripolitanians
80.	Makafin Kofar Wambai	Gazarzawans (Maguzawa)
81.	Makwalla	Kano Hausa
82.	Makwarari	Kano Hausa
83.	Malam Ganari	Bornuans
84.	Mandawari	Wangarawa
85.	Manladan	Nupe (**Malan Ladan**)
86.	Mararraba	Agalawa (Nigeriène Tuareg)
87.	Marmara	Kano Hausa
88.	Masukwani	Fulani/Kanuri
89.	Mazan Kwarai	Kano Hausa
90.	Rijiya Biyu	Tripolitanians
91.	Rijiya Hudu	Kano Hausa
92.	Rimin Kira	Kano Hausa
93.	Sabon Sara	Agalawa (Nigeriène Tuareg)
94.	Sagagi	Jukunawa

S/N	Ward	Main Settlers
95.	Sanka	Tripolitanians
96.	Satatima	Bornuans
97.	Sharfadi	Tripolitanians
98.	Sharifai	Tripolitanians
99.	Shatsari	Tripolitanians
100.	Shehe	Kano Hausa[5]
101.	Shirawa	Azare
102.	Soron Dinki	Courtiers
103.	Sudawa	Sudanese
104.	Takalmawa	Kano Hausa
105.	Tudun Makera	Tripolitanians
106.	Tudun Nufawa	Nupe
107.	Tudun Wada	Kano Hausa
108.	Tudun Wuzirci	Fulani
109.	Unguwar Ayagi	Yoruba
110.	Unguwar Gini	Kano Hausa
111.	Warure	Wangarawa
112.	Wudilawa	Fulani
113.	Yakasai	Jukunawa
114.	Yalwa	Agalawa (Nigeriène Tuareg)
115.	Yola	Fulani
116.	'Yan Tandu	Kano Hausa
117.	'Yandoya	Bornuans
118.	'Yanmuruci	Kano Hausa
119.	'Yan Awaki	Kano Hausa
120.	'Yar Kasuwa	Kano Hausa
121.	Zage	Wangarawa
122.	Zaitawa	Wangarawa
123.	Zango	Azben (Aïr Tuareg), Bornuans
124.	Zangon Barebari	Bornuans

Notes to Table 1

The settler information based on research by Dr. Muhammadu Uba Adamu and documented in his *Confluences and Influences: The Emergence of Kano As a City-State* Kano, Munawwar Books Foundation 1999). The *list* of the ward was modified from Hussain Sufi, *Mu San Kam Mu*, Kano: Mainasara Printers, Kano 1993.

1. The reference to *Kano Hausa* in the ethnic compositions of the ward is to mask the multiple nature of the Hausa residents. Quite a few of them came from rural Kano from notable settlements such as Rano, Takai, Kumbotso and so on. It would render the table more incomprehensible if the individual origins of the main Kano settlers are to be indicated.
2. Alhaji Maje, the Kano Ward genealogist does not seem to have this ward in his references; however, other oral sources do identify Chediyar Fero as existing in Kano; perhaps with different names. Indeed, it seems to be located near 'Yan Awaki and Kofar Wambai. See, P. J. Jaggar, Kano City Blacksmiths: Pre-colonial Distribution, Structure and Organization, *Savanna*, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1973, pp. 11-26. Jaggar refers to it as Chediyar *Pera*.
3. "Courtiers" refers to the main population of the ward as being from the house of the ruling dynasty, i.e. high palace officials and their retinue.
4. It is something of a historical curiosity that Durumin Iya ward contains the descendents of the sacked Kutumbawa dynasty. Many people still accord the direct descendents of the dynasty with some degree of highly regarded respect.
5. It would seem that Sheshe was originally attributed to Wangarawa settlement. But *the Wakar Bagauda* listed one of the early settlers of Kano in Antiquity a hunter named *Sheshe* — hundreds of years before the arrival of Wangarawa. The Wangarawa association was due to the establishment of a Madabo faculty at Sheshe, with the sheikh being referred to as *Malam Na-Sheshe*, which later became reverted to its original Sheshe.